| 1011 |
policy has centered on training |
the |
elite Somali Danab brigade and |
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| 1012 |
Africa Command (AFRICOM). </p> <p> |
The |
primary sticking point remains the |
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| 1013 |
The primary sticking point remains |
the |
Somali government’s internal political fractures, |
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| 1014 |
a holding pattern’ </p> <p> |
The |
report describes U.S. engagement as |
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| 1015 |
a holding pattern.” It argues |
the |
primary reason for failure against |
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| 1016 |
Somalia’s “fractured politics.“ </p> <p> |
The |
government in Mogadishu is “mired |
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| 1017 |
states over power and resources, |
the |
ICG wrote. These quarrels “hinder |
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| 1018 |
ICG wrote. These quarrels “hinder |
the |
development of a united front |
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| 1019 |
a united front to fight |
the |
insurgents.” </p> <p> As an |
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| 1020 |
</p> <p> As an example, |
the |
report noted that while the |
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